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Abstract 
This paper quantifies potential long-term social and economic gains developing 
countries  can  reap  from  investing  in  human  development.  The  discussion 
revolves  around  public  spending  and financing  strategies  in  pursuance  of  the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in four countries. Quantifications are 
based on scenarios that are simulated by applying an economy-wide modelling 
framework that captures the wide range of effects of bold public interventions 
throughout the economy. Simulated significant stepping up of public spending to 
pursue a set of MDG targets by 2015 and maintain sound human development 
indicators thereafter spurs economic gains in the long run. The macroeconomic 
implications  of  using  alternative  sources  of  financing  for  the  newly-added 
spending ultimately define the effect on public finances and economic growth. 
Simulated  public  spending  unambiguously  boosts  aggregate  demand,  though. 
The supply response is such that product factors accumulate and productivity 
rises as larger numbers of better-educated workers are effectively employed to 
deliver social services and in other sectors of the economy. GDP growth gains 
between  0.2  to  1.0  percentage  points  per  year  after  2015  are  estimated  and 
options to magnify them are identified. 
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1. Introduction 
Member  states  of  the  United  Nations  resolved  to  pursue  the  achievement  of  the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. They set concrete targets to be met by 
2015, aiming at a future of less poverty, hunger and disease, better education, gender 
equality, greater prospects of survival for children and mothers and a more sustainable 
environment. Much progress has been made since then, but this has been uneven across 
and  within  countries  (United  Nations,  2012).  Some  countries  have  witnessed  human 
development setbacks as a result of the global financial crisis (United Nations, 2011).  
Business as usual is not proving enough to achieve the pace of progress necessary 
to meet international agreed development goals by 2015 in many developing countries. 
Additional  policy  interventions  will  be  needed.  Studies  for  27  developing  countries, 
documented in Sánchez and Vos (2013) and Sánchez and others (2010), estimate that to 
be put on full track to meet a set of MDG targets by 2015 countries would have needed 
significant stepping up of public spending and more rapid and sustained economic growth. 
Achieving economic growth in the midst of a depressed world economy is proving a 
significant challenge, though. And, as these studies also show, given existing financing 
constrains, accelerated human development investments up to 2015 would overstretch 
countries’ public finances with potential short-term macroeconomic hardships that might 
jeopardize the badly needed economic growth.  
In defining what human development interventions they want to pursue, countries 
should  estimate  not  only  public  spending  requirements  and  the  macroeconomic 
implications of financing these, but also the potential social and economic rewards. The 
aforementioned studies provide rigorous estimates for simulation periods until 2015, the 
year  for  which  most  MDG  targets  are  expected  to  have  been  met.  Nonetheless, 
estimations  of  how  soon  long-term  rewards  of  human  development  interventions  can 
materialize and the degree of their significance are less known. Gains from investing in 
human  development  take  time  to  materialize.  Capital  may  be  accumulated  relatively 
quickly but it takes time for better education and health outcomes to translate into social 
outcomes  and  human  capital  that  produces  higher  labour  productivity  (and  economic 
growth), if only because children need to go through one or more educational cycles and 
improved child and maternal health care today will pay off in terms of healthier students   3
and workers several years from now. Equally important, countries need to identify the set 
of policies that can give coherence to the multiple tasks of ensuring that such long-term 
rewards  can  effectively  materialize,  which  implies  also  sustaining  sound  human 
development  levels  (and  spending),  economic  growth,  employment  creation  and 
macroeconomic balances.  
Understanding  the  potential  long-term  rewards  of  human  development 
investments and the policy interventions necessary to ensure they materialize and at what 
macroeconomic costs is crucial to define national development strategies after 2015. This 
understanding  comes  timely  to  inform  the  process  of  defining  the  post-2015  UN 
development  agenda  in  the  making.
1 In  this  vein,  this  paper  aims  to  answer  two 
fundamental questions: what social and economic gains associated with past investments 
in human development, especially those made in the context of pursuing the MDGs by 
2015,  can  developing  countries  realistically  expect?;  what  policy  interventions  would 
contribute to ensure that such social gains and economic payoffs effectively materialize?  
Finding coherent and rigorous answers to these questions requires the use of an 
economy-wide  modelling  framework.  The  aforementioned  studies  for  27  developing 
countries applied the Maquette for MDG Simulations (MAMS) in order to assess feasible 
financing  strategies  to  meet  the  MDGs.  MAMS  is  a  dynamic-recursive,  computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model (Lofgren and others, 2013). It is innovative in the sense 
that  it  comprises  a  set  of  basic  human  development  objectives  related  to  poverty 
reduction, primary education, maternal and child mortality, and access to water and basic 
sanitation. Policy efforts to meet these objectives, which are not restricted to the social 
policy arena, involve the entire economy through a number of transmission mechanisms 
that are captured in MAMS. For example, poverty reduction efforts that run from, say, 
cash transfers, require financing by the government and are expected to affect household 
consumption, all of which can trigger additional effects through production, employment, 
wages and prices. Expansion of social services in education, health and basic sanitation 
also  requires  additional  spending  efforts  that  may  strain  public  and  private  budgets. 
Adjustments in taxes and public and private credit demand to finance those spending 
                                                 
1 For more details on this process, see, for instance, the report to the Secretary-General of the UN System 
Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Realizing the Future We Want for All, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/untt_report.pdf   4
needs, in turn, will have repercussions throughout the economy. Better education and 
health outcomes are expected to yield, over time, positive spinoffs on productivity and 
incomes. This range of transmission mechanisms justifies the use of an economy-wide 
model such as MAMS to assess the impacts and costing of human development policies. 
However, the majority of existing applications of MAMS with country datasets 
have focused on assessing financing strategies to achieve the MDGs by 2015, without 
looking beyond that target  year. That is to say, these applications have not explicitly 
determined  payoffs  and  potential  macroeconomic  costs  of  policy  interventions  tilted 
towards  keeping  human  development  goals  fully  achieved  after  2015.  This  paper 
addresses  such  longer-term  perspective  and,  in  doing  so,  it  makes  some  necessary 
extensions to MAMS and applies it to four developing countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Uganda and Yemen). 
  MAMS and the extensions made to one of its functional specifications for the 
purposes  of  elaborating  this  paper  are  briefly  described  in  section  2.  The  subsequent 
section addresses data and calibration issues that are relevant to explain how the model 
was applied using datasets for the four selected countries. Also, a baseline scenario that 
was generated for each of these countries is described. Section 4 focuses on the analysis 
of policy scenarios that are compared with the baseline scenario to quantify potential 
gains from past human development investments and identify certain conditions that once 
met would contribute to secure these gains and magnify their impact over the years. The 
final section concludes and provides policy recommendations.  
 
2. Modelling framework 
MAMS  is  used  to  simulate  various  scenarios.  As  indicated,  the  use  of  a  dynamic-
recursive  CGE  model,  such  as  MAMS,  is  justified  because  the  pursuit  of  a  strategy 
towards the achievement of the MDGs, or any other human development aspiration in 
general, will likely have strong effects throughout the economy. Such strategy would 
affect  demand  and  supply  in  the  different  markets  (goods  and  services,  factors  and 
foreign  exchange),  and  the  related  adjustments  may  imply  important  trade-offs 
throughout  the  period  for  achieving  the  development  goals  and  beyond.  MAMS,  in 
particular, also takes into consideration the possible synergies between the different goals.   5
Such synergies may influence the required expansion of services (for example, greater 
coverage of drinking water supply may reduce the need for health service expansion) or 
the speed at which the various MDGs are achieved. 
The  strategy  adopted  to  finance  the  required  public  spending  also  affects  the 
outcomes. For example, foreign financing may induce real exchange rate effects while 
financing  through  domestic  taxes  could  reduce  private  consumption  demand,  among 
other  things,  and  domestic  borrowing  could  crowd  out  credit  resources  for  private 
investment.  No  doubt,  increased  public  spending  is  essential  for  meeting  human 
development  goals,  but  adjustments  in  the  real  exchange  rate,  real  wages  and  other 
relative prices may raise the unit costs for meeting these goals along with the costs for 
other sectors, or discourage exports, thereby widening the external deficit that needs to be 
financed, and so on. Productivity gains accruing exclusively from reaching higher human 
development  standards  will  take  some  time  to  materialize  and  are  thus  unlikely  to 
immediately trigger their full impact on economic growth. MAMS is a useful tool to, 
inter  alia,  assess  short-run  macroeconomic  trade-offs  and  see  if  these  would  offset 
economic and social gains that can potentially be reaped in the longer-run. 
MAMS  has  been  built  from  a  fairly  standard  CGE  framework  with  dynamic-
recursive features but it innovatively incorporates a special module which specifies the 
main  determinants  of  MDG  achievement  and  the  direct  impact  of  enhanced  public 
expenditures  on  MDG-related  infrastructure  and  services—as  explained  in  length  in 
Lofgren and others (2013). It considers specific targets for achieving universal primary 
education (MDG 2), reducing under-five and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) and 
increasing access to safe water and basic sanitation (MDG 7). The indicator used for 
monitoring MDG 2 is not just enrolment but the net (on-time) primary completion rate 
which is a function of student behaviour (enrolment, promotion, graduation)—since most 
developing  countries  have  already  achieved  decent  levels  of  enrolment  in  primary 
education. A target is set for completion on time, without repetition, for the relevant age 
cohort  for  primary  school—where  developing  countries  lag  far  behind  more.  Student 
behaviour, in turn, depends on the quality of education (service delivery per student), 
income incentives (the expected wage premium from education), the under-five mortality 
rate (a proxy for the health status of the student population), household consumption per   6
capita  (as  indicator  of  real  living  standard)  and  public  infrastructure  (such  as  roads, 
bridges, electricity networks, and so on, which facilitate access to and functioning of 
education  centres).  Under-five  and  maternal  mortality  rates  are  considered  to  be 
determined by the availability of public and private health services per capita, household 
consumption  per  capita,  the  level  of  public  infrastructure  (such  as  roads,  bridges, 
electricity  networks,  and  so  on,  which  facilitate  access  to  and  functioning  of  health 
centres and hospitals), and the coverage of water and sanitation services. Access to water 
and sanitation, on the other hand, depends on  household consumption per capita, the 
provision of such services by public or private providers and public infrastructure.  
The  effectiveness  of  these  determinants  of  MDG  achievement  follows  a  non-
linear pattern. Logistic functions for the “production” of the different MDG indicators 
and  student  behaviours  are  generated  in  such  way  that  each  determinant  becomes 
relatively less effective as progress towards a predefined target is made. Social services 
may be provided publicly or privately; nonetheless, it is only new government investment 
and current expenditures that will lead to a policy-driven increase in the supply of social 
services and public infrastructure that ensures meeting one or simultaneous development 
targets.  The  government  can  be  assumed  to  mobilize  sufficient  domestic  or  foreign 
resources to finance new spending requirements to meet these targets. 
The goal of reducing extreme poverty (MDG 1) is not targeted in the same way as 
the other MDGs are targeted given the absence of tools that policymakers realistically 
could resort to achieve specific poverty outcomes in most real-world, developing-country 
contexts. CGE models like MAMS also typically fail to specify the income distribution 
detail that is required to properly estimate poverty at the household level, given the use of 
“representative households”. The approach to compute poverty followed here is simple 
and has shortcomings in view of the long-term perspective of the modelling analysis. It is 
assumed that an initial distribution of per-capita welfare (income/consumption) within the 
model’s single representative household follows a log-normal distribution. This approach 
is  widely  accepted  as  a  good  approximation  for  within-country  income/consumption 
distributions (Bourguignon, 2003; Easterly, 2009). Changes in welfare per capita of the 
model representative household with respect to the initial situation due to a simulated 
policy  shock,  for  example,  are  used  to  estimate  the  counterfactual  (log-normal)   7
distribution  of  per  capita  welfare  in  all  simulated  scenarios.  Poverty  and  inequality 
indicators are computed for both the initial and the policy-shock situation and can be 
compared.
2  
Output  growth  in  MAMS  depends  on  the  accumulation  of  production  factors 
(labour at different educational levels, private capital, and other factors such as land and 
natural resources) and changes in total factor productivity (TFP). In the original version 
of MAMS, TFP, in turn, is influenced by the accumulation of government capital stocks 
and openness to foreign trade. These relationships count on empirical backing. Arslanalp 
and others (2010), for instance, have estimated the impact of public capital on economic 
growth for 48 OECD and non-OECD countries during the period from 1960 to 2001. 
Using the production function approach and its extensions, they find a positive elasticity 
of output with respect to public capital, which is robust to changes in time intervals and 
varying  depreciation  rates.  A  vast  empirical  literature  also  agrees  on  the  positive 
association between openness and growth, and in some studies such an association is 
found to be robust to the measure of openness (see, e.g., Greenaway and others, 2001; 
Edwards, 1988, 1998).
3 
Given the long-term perspective of this paper’s modelling analysis, MAMS has 
been extended to include an additional, key driver of productivity growth. As indicated, it 
takes  time  for  better  education  and  health  outcomes  to  translate  into  higher  labour 
productivity if only because children need to go through one or more educational cycles 
and improved child and maternal health care today will pay off in terms of healthier 
                                                 
2 Studies presented in Sánchez and Vos (2013) and Sánchez and others (2010) combine MAMS scenario 
results and a non-parametric microsimulation model that is applied using household survey data in order to 
calculate poverty and inequality indicators. This approach permits full account of the income distribution 
recorded in a household survey such that assumptions about the income distribution  within the  model 
representative household are no longer required. The simulation period of these studies extends only until 
2015,  however,  such  that  their  assumptions  about  demographic  changes  need  not  be  fairly  restrictive. 
Household surveys are not available for many years into the future and using one or a set of existing 
surveys would require accepting a number of additional assumptions that become very restrictive into the 
longer  run.  Examples  of  these  assumptions  are  that  no  demographic  changes  take  place  during  the 
simulation  period  or  that  these  changes  can  be  imposed  exogenously  with  limited  information  about 
population dynamics. The use of a microsimulation model is avoided in this paper because the modelling 
analysis is extended up to 2030. 
3 Rodríguez and Rodrik (1999) have, however, argued that the vast literature supporting this association 
may  be  affected  by  methodological  problems  because  the  indicators  of  openness  used  may  be  poor 
measures of trade barriers or may be highly correlated with other sources of bad economic performance.   8
students and workers several years from now. Spending more to improve education and 
health outcomes is one of the policies governments undertake to invest in human capital.  
Nelson and Phelps (1966) developed the first model of endogenous technological 
progress to analyse the role of human capital in technological progress. Edwards (1992, 
1998) adapted this model to include the role of openness on growth and TFP growth. In 
these models, TFP growth is positively correlated with the domestic rate of innovation 
and  the  speed  at  which  a  country  closes  the  ‘knowledge  gap’.  The  domestic  rate  of 
innovation depends on the level of human capital, in line with a number of models of 
endogenous economic growth whereby larger stocks of human capital allow countries to 
catch up with the technological leaders faster (Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988).
4 A positive 
and significant impact of human capital on growth and TFP growth has been observed in 
studies conducted for a large sample of countries (see, e.g., Edwards, 1998; Barro, 1991). 
The speed at which a country closes the ‘knowledge gap’ depends on the rate at which 
the country is able to absorb (or imitate) technological progress originated in the leading 
nations. Such absorption is positively  related to the degree of openness, since this is 
expected  to  allow  the  introduction  of  new  products  and  methods  and  provide  more 
contact with the world market, as suggested by some literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995;  Romer,  1992;  Grossman  and  Helpman,  1991).  In  consequence,  more  open 
economies  will  lead  to  a  higher  steady-state  stock  of  knowledge  and,  other  things 
remaining the same, higher productivity and output growth. 
Investment in schooling (whether this is represented by the number of years of 
education of the population or spending in education), which, as said, is a policy typically 
used  by  governments  to  build  human  capital,  has  also  been  found  to  be  positively 
correlated  with  GDP  growth  in  large  samples  of  countries  (see,  e.g.,  Klenow  and 
Rodríguez-Clare, 2005, and evidence and literature referred to in Hughes, 2007). 
Against this theoretical and empirical background, MAMS has been extended to 
incorporate the direct impact of human capital on TFP. In view of this extension to the 
modelling framework, the impact of pursuing goals for education and health on economic 
                                                 
4 The endogenous productivity growth literature also emphasizes the role of R&D on innovation as this 
enables a more effective use of existing resources. There is convincing evidence that R&D is an important 
determinant of productivity in developed nations (see, e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe and Moghadam, 
1993; Griliches, 1988).     9
growth is expected to be larger than it is recorded in existing MAMS applications. The 
stock of human capital as a determinant of productivity is often proxied by the years of 
education of the population or spending in education.  In this paper it is alternatively 
proxied by the stock of skilled labour. The latter, in turn, is defined by the number of 
workers  who  have  at  least  completed  secondary  education  and  are  employed.
5 The 
applications of MAMS presented in this paper assume that there is not full employment 
of labour. The unemployment rate is endogenous and clears the market for each type of 
labour.
6 As a consequence, skilled workers, as defined above, would affect productivity 
only if they are employed. This specification is useful to pin down mismatches between 
the  supply  of  and  demand  for  skilled  labour.  Unemployment  of  skilled  labour,  for 
example, may signal investments in human capital do not go hand in hand with economic 
changes that are necessary to adequately absorb the population of skilled workers.  
 
3. Data, calibration and baseline scenario 
The basic accounting structure of MAMS is derived from a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). For each of the four countries under study, a SAM has been constructed using 
data from official national accounts (i.e., supply and use tables, institutions’ accounts and 
macro  aggregates),  fiscal  accounts,  balance  of  payments  information  and  a  recent 
household  survey.
7 These  SAMs  share  the  following  characteristics:  (a)  possess  a 
relatively detailed treatment of public investment and its financing; (b) seven government 
activities  correspondingly  provide  seven  services:  three  types  of  education  (primary, 
secondary  and  tertiary),  health,  water  and  sanitation,  public  infrastructure  and  other 
government  services;  (c)  the  private  service  sector  is  also  disaggregated  into  three 
education activities and a private health activity, in addition to other private services; (d) 
the rest of the economic activities are disaggregated into various sectors the number of 
                                                 
5 The educational attainment of the population at working age (for instance, age 15 and above) is being 
used rather than the education of the population of age 25 and above which has been a common stock 
measure of human capital. As explained in Hughes (2007), conceptually, a focus on the education of the 
population above age 15 might be better, especially for developing countries where most of those above 15 
will be in the labor force.  
6 This mechanism would no longer hold if the unemployment rate reaches a predefined minimum; at this 
point the real wage becomes the clearing variable of the market. 
7 These SAMs have been built by teams of national experts under technical guidance of this paper’s authors, 
as part of capacity development projects coordinated by DPAD/UN-DESA and other institutional partners.   10 
which varies by country; (e) among the factors of production, there are three types of 
labour that are linked directly to an educational cycle: workers with less than completed 
secondary education (unskilled), with completed secondary education but not completed 
tertiary (skilled) and with completed tertiary (highly skilled). The remaining factors of 
production include public capital stocks by government activity, a private capital stock, 
and natural resources used in mining and agriculture; and (d) the institutions include the 
government,  a  “representative”  household  (the  private  domestic  institution,  which 
represents both households and domestic enterprises), and the rest of the world.  
MAMS’ datasets for each of the countries also include data related to the different 
MDGs, the labour market, and a set of elasticities. Key information to calibrate the model 
are levels of service delivery that would presumably be required to meet the different 
MDGs, number of students at different educational cycles, student behavioural patterns in 
terms  of  promotion  rates  and  other  indicators,  and  number  of  workers  and  initial 
unemployment rates for the three types of workers. The elasticities define behaviour in 
production, trade, consumption and MDG functions. As for the later, logistic models have 
been estimated to identify the influence of both supply and demand factors on outcomes 
in education, health and coverage of drinking water and sanitation. The findings of these 
empirical analyses were used to calibrate the MDG module of MAMS for each country 
application. Calibration was subsequently made to ensure that each country application of 
MAMS  reproduced  past  MDG  progress  which  was  projected  into  the  future  under  a 
continuation of economic trends and public spending policies.
8  
The  parameterization  of  the  endogenous  drivers  of  productivity  growth  is 
conservative  and  has  been  defined  on  the  basis  of  existing  empirical  evidence.  The 
following  elasticities  (and  ranges  used  for  all  four  countries)  were  used:  0.01  for 
openness  to  foreign  trade,  0.05  for  the  stock  of  public  infrastructure,  and  0.25  for 
                                                 
8  The  calibration  took  as  starting  points  elasticity  values  computed  in  the  framework  of  capacity 
development  projects  coordinated  by  DPAD/UN-DESA.  The  authors  of  this  paper  acted  as  resource 
persons and technical advisors to these projects. For details on the initial elasticity values used in the 
calibration of the MDG module of MAMS, see Ponce (2012) for Bolivia, Pacheco (2012) for Costa Rica, 
Matovu and others (2011) for Uganda, and Sánchez and Sbrana (2009) and Sbrana (2009) for Yemen.   11 
employment of skilled labour. The latter elasticity is essentially in the middle of a range 
of elasticity values that have been defined after reviewing empirical literature.
9  
A baseline scenario was generated for each country after completing the model 
calibration process, in order to formulate a benchmark against which different policy 
scenarios are compared. Starting from a base year (2004 for Yemen, 2005 for Costa Rica, 
2006 for Bolivia and fiscal year 2009/2010 for Uganda), the baseline scenario replicates 
actual economic performance under policies implemented in recent years (until around 
2011/2012) and projects it up to 2030. Economic growth assumptions—including the 
deceleration  in  GDP  growth  caused  by  the  global  financial  crisis  of  2008-2009—are 
country-specific. In order to mimic unchanged expenditure policies of the recent past, 
government consumption and other components of recurrent spending evolve following a 
rule: that is to say, they represent a pre-defined share of GDP. Government investment 
spending depends on the demand for capital in the public services sector and the latter, in 
turn, varies as the government consumes to deliver services. Any emerging fiscal deficit 
(or surplus) is assumed to be financed (adjusted) by transfers from the rest of the world 
(foreign borrowing for Costa Rica and grant aid for the other three countries).
10 Private 
investment is assumed to remain fixed as a share of GDP, while savings rates of private 
agents  adjust  endogenously  to  ensure  the  model  consistency  requirement  that  total 
savings equal total investment is met. 
Under these economy-wide assumptions, countries’ GDP and their demand-side 
components evolve as shown in Table 1 for pre-2015 (from base year to 2015) and post-
2015  (from  2016  to  2030)  periods.  Baseline  GDP  growth  resembles  observed  GDP 
growth until 2012. Between 2013 and 2030, GDP grows steadily at the rate observed in 
2012. GDP growth decelerates owing to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, except 
                                                 
9 The elasticity of productivity growth with respect to different types of R&D stocks and expenditure, for 
example, has been found to be in the range of 0.07-0.56 (Abdih and Joutz, 2005; Furman and Hayes, 2004; 
Wang  and  Tsai,  2003;  Guellec  and  van  Pottelsberghe  de  la  Potterie,  2001;  Cameron,  Proudman  and 
Redding, 1999). Or,  with respect to the share of GDP spent on secondary and tertiary education, this 
elasticity has been found to be around 0.09. 
10 Uganda and Yemen are low income countries and Bolivia is a lower-middle income country, according 
to the World Bank country classification by income. These countries have relied heavily on foreign aid to 
finance human capital investments. Costa Rica is less likely to receive foreign grant aid from donors to 
support its government budget being an upper-middle income country. Alternatively, MAMS permits to 
finance the emerging fiscal deficits in scenarios such as these, through increased taxation or domestic 
public borrowing, options that are used as part of this paper’s policy scenario analysis.   12 
in Uganda’s baseline which starts from the fiscal year of 2009/2010. Economic recovery 
after the global financial crisis is modest in all cases but Uganda’s where GDP grows 
notably more after 2015 owing to a projected increase in aggregate demand. Economic 
growth is by and large fairly balanced over the years in all four countries, as measured by 
the GDP share of demand-side components. Aggregate demand continues to rely heavily 
on private consumption mainly, but also on exports to a lesser extent.
11 Foreign savings 
increase  relative  to  GDP  over  the  years,  which  is  consistent  with  the  government 
financing its deficit using foreign sources. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The baseline scenario also depicts the (endogenous) evolution of MDG indicators 
under  a  continuation  of  economic  conditions  and  policies,  and  considers  the 
complementarities or synergies in achieving the various development goals. As described 
in  the  previous  section,  MAMS  considers  how  much  improved  health  contributes  to 
accelerate  progress  towards  the  education  goal  and  how  much  increased  access  to 
drinking water and basic sanitation contributes to reducing mortality rates. Continued 
public  spending  in  MDG-related  services  (primary  education,  health  and  water  and 
sanitation) is one of the key drivers of MDG outcomes under the baseline (Table 2). 
Government  service  delivery  continues  to  grow  after  2015  due  to  the  projected 
continuation of social spending policies implemented after the global financial crisis and 
the growth of GDP—of which government consumption of MDG-related services is a 
fixed share, especially in those countries (Bolivia, Uganda and Yemen) where output is 
projected to gain steam after 2015. Public investment spending increases to the extent 
needed for the government to be able to deliver social services (not shown in Table 2). 
Private consumption of primary education, health, and water and sanitation, total real per-
                                                 
11 Newfound oil resources are expected to flow in Uganda in the near future. The potential growth of crude 
oil exports has not been taking into consideration to generate Uganda’s baseline scenario, though, due to 
lack of empirical ground to generate a plausible trend of these expected revenues.    13 
capita private consumption and the accumulation of public infrastructure capital stock 
grow at rates that also permit them to trigger a positive impact on the MDG indicators.
12  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Under  the  said  baseline  assumptions,  all  four  countries  would  make  apparent 
progress towards meeting, by 2015, those MDG targets being analysed (Figure 1). Costa 
Rica, the country recording the lowest initial MDG gaps, does not meet all targets by 
2015 only by very small margins; which in the particular  case of non-poverty MDG 
indicators is primarily explained by government consumption growing more rapidly than 
GDP (see Table 1).
13 Bolivia only meets the water and sanitation targets whereas Uganda 
and  Yemen  meet  none.  In  sum,  in  spite  of  projected  progress,  continued  trends  of 
economic growth and social public spending would not be enough to achieve all MDG 
targets by 2015. Additional policies and higher and more sustained economic growth will 
be required. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The challenges to achieve human development goals by 2015 may be of more 
significance  in  the  face  of  volatile  economic  conditions  of  which  the  recent  global 
financial crisis was but one manifestation. Persistent international financial market and 
commodity price instability have affected the economies of the four countries covered to 
varying degrees, and differences in policy responsiveness further explain varying impacts 
on human development. Economic uncertainty has been compounded by political conflict 
and instability of different nature in countries such as Uganda and Yemen. These are 
                                                 
12 MDG indicators are also influenced depending on the importance of the GDP shares of each government 
and private spending item and the country-specific elasticity values by which determinants presented in 
Table  2  are  estimated  to  affect  the  indicators.  Income  incentives  (the  expected  wage  premium  from 
education) are not estimated to have any strong influence on student behaviour in primary education. 
13 In spite of the higher human development levels achieved under Costa Rica’s baseline scenario, the 
evolution of the primary completion rate reflects, on one hand, marked inefficiencies of spending that are 
not assumed to be as strict under the other countries’ baseline scenarios and, on the other hand, more 
aggressive targeting of outcomes in secondary education.   14 
aspects  the  modelling  analysis  cannot  fully  account  for  but  are  worth  considering  to 
understand these countries’ real human development challenges. 
 
4. Policy scenarios and analysis 
Four policy scenarios are generated (Sim1-Sim4) which are compared with the baseline 
scenario  to:  (i)  quantify  social  and  economic  growth  gains  after  2015  owing  to  past 
MDG-related investments and (ii) identify policy interventions that may contribute to 
secure  them.  These  policy  scenarios  delineate  a  path  towards  fully  meeting  the  non-
poverty targets depicted in Figure 1. They are hereafter regarded as the “MDG-achieving 
scenarios”. The policy variable is “MDG-related public spending”, which includes all 
investment  and  current  expenditures  in  primary  education,  health  and  water  and 
sanitation. This spending is scaled up, at each country’s estimated effectiveness, in order 
to increase the net (on-time) primary school completion rate, reduce child and maternal 
mortality rates and improve access to drinking water supply and basic sanitation until 
targets are met by 2015.
14 GDP shares of public spending in primary education, health 
and  water  and  sanitation  in  2015  (hereafter,  “MDG-achieving  GDP  shares  of  public 
spending”)  are  maintained  unchanged  after  2015  to  avoid  setbacks  in  human 
development in the first two policy scenarios.  
Additional public spending requirements to meet non-poverty targets by 2015 and 
maintain  MDG-achieving  GDP  shares  of  public  spending  unchanged  afterwards  are 
financed through foreign sources in all scenarios but the second (Sim2). In the latter, the 
government is assumed to have the capacity to mobilize direct-tax revenues, instead of 
foreign resources, in order to maintain MDG-achieving GDP shares of public spending 
unchanged after 2015.
15 Running this scenario is relevant because reliance on foreign 
                                                 
14 To meet the targets, MDG-related spending is assumed to be endogenous through 2015—that is to say, it 
no longer follows a rule as in the baseline scenario. MAMS remains a fully determined model to generate 
the policy scenarios because non-poverty MDG indicators become exogenous at fixed, MDG-achieving 
values along a logistic function through 2015. The caveat is that public spending increases from the base 
year of each country’s application, not from a more recent year. Therefore, the scenarios help to quantify 
the additional public spending that the four countries should have scaled up by, say, 2012 to have been 
fully on track to meet their MDG targets by 2015. This comes on top of the additional public spending that 
these countries would have to incur between 2013 and 2015 to meet the targets. 
15 The budget financing assumptions of the baseline scenario are changed for scenario Sim2 where any 
fiscal deficit emerging in 2016-2030 is financed through direct-tax revenues rather than foreign resources. 
Also, in all four policy scenarios, private investment becomes “savings-driven” and no longer follows the   15 
resources may not be a sustainable option in the long run in view of debt sustainability 
considerations  and  the  apparent  declining  availability  of  foreign  aid  by  international 
donors. Countries will eventually be required to deepen domestic resource mobilization.
16 
The four countries under study, in particular, may still have ample scope for reforms 
aiming at increasing tax revenues; in fact, the tax burden in these countries is relatively 
low as large parts of their (informal) economy remain untaxed and there is substantial tax 
evasion and exceptions.
17 In any case, even in most low-income countries social service 
delivery  and  poverty  reduction  programmes  are  largely  financed  through  domestic 
resource mobilization.  
GDP growth in the MDG-achieving scenarios is found to be higher than under the 
baseline  between  2016  and  2030,  as  further  explained  below.  As  a  consequence,  the 
assumption that MDG-achieving  GDP shares of public spending  are  fixed after 2015 
implies overachievement of MDG targets post-2015 in the first two scenarios (see results 
for Sim1 in Figure A1, in the Appendix). In view of this result, the net (on time) primary 
completion rate (mdg2) achieved in 2015 under the first two scenarios is left unchanged 
in 2016-2030 in the last two scenarios (Sim3-Sim4). Thus, public spending in primary 
education in the last two scenarios is lower than in the first two both as a share of GDP 
and  in  absolute  terms.  Resulting  “public  spending  savings”—relative  to  the  first  two 
policy scenarios—are allocated to secondary and tertiary education in the third scenario 
(Sim3) and public infrastructure (roads, bridges, and so on) in the fourth (Sim4).
18 These 
                                                                                                                                                 
rule that it is a fixed share of GDP as in the baseline scenario. The amount of private investment that can be 
realized at the end of the day depends on the total availability of savings in the policy scenarios. Generally 
speaking, it can be argued that the four countries under study tend to face overall financing constraints, 
especially given their generally low initial levels of domestic savings which prompts them to resort to 
already limited access to international capital markets. 
16 Domestic borrowing is unlikely to quickly become a real financing source for development in the four 
countries under study where domestic capital markets are shallow and domestic savings are constrained. 
For this reason, it was not considered as a feasible option to include in the policy scenarios. 
17 According to World Bank data for the most recent year available, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
represented 17.0 in 2007 in Bolivia, 13.5 in 2011 in Costa Rica, 16.1 in 2011 in Uganda and only 7.0 in 
2009 in Yemen.  
18 In  the  last  two  policy  scenarios  spending  in  secondary  and  tertiary  education  (Sim3)  and  public 
infrastructure (Sim4), respectively, becomes endogenous to accommodate to the newly generated fiscal 
space  from  not  pursing  further  improvements  in  the  net  (on  time)  primary  completion  rate.  Foreign 
resources  used  to  finance  the  budget  are  maintained  fixed  at  the  absolute  levels  of  the  first  scenario 
(Sim1)—and  the  model  remains  fully  determined.  The  choice  of  keeping  the  net  (on  time)  primary 
completion rate unchanged after 2015 is arbitrary and fixing any other non-poverty indicator would have 
also resulted in “public spending savings” that one could use to incur expenditures in other sectors.    16 
two simulations have been designed with a purpose. More spending in higher levels of 
education increases the stock of better-educated workers, a number of who may become 
employed,  thus  spurring  productivity  and  economic  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  new 
investments  in  public  infrastructure  directly  drive  more  productivity  and  economic 
growth and indirectly they also yield additional productivity gains if the newly-added 
GDP growth is skilled-labour intensive. The most salient aspects of each of the four 
policy scenarios are summarized in the following table. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Keeping sound human development levels is costly 
The  comparison  of  the  policy  scenarios  and  the  baseline  yields  interesting  results. 
Additional  public  spending  requirements  to  meet  non-poverty  targets  by  2015  are 
estimated from subtracting total spending on MDG-related public spending under each of 
the  MDG-achieving  scenarios  from  the  same  type  of  spending  recorded  under  the 
baseline. In the pre-2015 period, additional public spending requirements represent, on 
average, around 4.0 per cent of GDP per year in Bolivia (BOL) and Costa Rica (CRI), 
and 8.5 per cent of GDP per year in Uganda (UGA) and Yemen (YEM) (see Figure 2).
19 
Interestingly, in spite of good progress towards the non-poverty targets under the baseline 
scenario, especially in Costa Rica where targets fall short of being met by very small 
margins, the four countries need significant stepping up of upfront public spending in 
order  to  achieve  the  non-poverty  goals.  Uganda  and  Yemen  would  have  to  scale  up 
spending in amounts that would be much larger than what they would have otherwise 
spent without additional interventions. Some of these countries could unlikely incur such 
expenditures to meet MDG targets by 2015. This finding accords with that of a number of 
country studies presented in Sánchez and Vos (2013) and Sánchez and others (2010). 
This paper’s modelling analysis provides new insights in regards to public spending that 
may be required to avoid human development setbacks after 2015.  
 
                                                 
19 Yemen’s estimate of additional public spending requirements likely would have turned out to be larger 
should the effects of recent conflict were fully taken into account.   17 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
The direct costs of the interventions aiming at meeting the MDG targets by 2015 
are high in part because the baseline reproduces actual MDG progress—from the base 
year to around 2012—and for some of the targets countries have not been fully on track. 
But the high cost estimates—in terms of additional public spending requirements—are 
also affected by complementarities or synergies in achieving the various development 
goals,  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  additional  public  spending  and  the  source  of 
financing for the additional public spending. Decreasing marginal returns to additional 
public spending, in particular, over time increase the marginal costs to achieve each of 
the development goals, particularly when countries are approaching meeting their targets. 
MDG-achieving GDP shares of public spending set at the point of highest decreasing 
marginal returns to additional public spending such that keeping these shares unchanged 
after 2015 turns out to be most costly for public finances (see Figure 2).  
These cost estimates suggest that keeping sound human development levels after 
2015 could be excessively costly to achieve because of decreasing marginal returns to 
public spending interventions. Countries will need to find ways to enhance the efficiency 
of service delivery in order to contain costs. In the case of Costa Rica, for instance, where 
public spending in education represents nearly 8 per cent of GDP, the government would 
already find it quite challenging to further increase primary school completion because 
nearly 11 per cent of students enrolled in first grade repeated the grade by 2012. In this 
particular case, then, reforms to the teaching, learning and evaluation system may be 
more cost-effective to increase primary school completion than merely continuing raising 
public education expenditures. Examples of similar inefficiencies could be provided for 
other sectors and countries. 
Obviously, the high  estimated costs are not solely associated with the lack of 
effectiveness of spending. They are partly model driven as in the policy scenarios the so-
called MDG-achieving GDP shares of public spending are maintained fixed after 2015 
and GDP grows at decent and stable rates. Compared with the estimates of the previous 
studies mentioned above, they are also higher estimates because the effects of the global 
financial crisis on economic growth and human development setbacks have been more   18 
fully accounted for under the baseline. At the same time, the high estimated costs may be 
also reflecting that some of the internationally agreed goals that have been targeted in the 
policy scenarios may be overly ambitious for particular developing countries’ contexts. 
Al-Batuly  and  others  (2013),  for  example,  who  also  use  MAMS  to  analyze  MDG-
achieving scenarios up to 2015 for Yemen, concluded that it would be unrealistic to 
pursue internationally agreed goals in this country given fairly high public spending and 
financing requirements.  In our policy scenarios, in fact, we are by and large treating 
global goals as national targets. Literature points to the inaccuracy that one may run into 
when estimating the shortfall between achievement and target in the context of the MDGs 
(see, e.g., Fukuda-Parr and others, 2013; Easterley, 2009). However, our focus is more on 
the  extent  to  which  financing  the  additional  spending  requirements  triggers 
macroeconomic  trade-offs  that  may  hamper  potential  long-term  rewards  of  human 
development investments, rather than on claiming there is full accuracy in the estimates 
that we present. 
 
Domestic resource mobilization and macroeconomic trade-offs 
A comparison between the first two policy scenarios (Sim1 and Sim2) is also useful to 
illustrate  that  the  financing  mechanism  matters  for  the  estimates  of  additional  public 
spending  requirements  to  pursue  human  development.  Financing  these  requirements 
through higher direct-tax revenues after 2015, for example, somewhat raises the total 
costs for public finances in all cases but one (Uganda), as compared with a scenario 
where  external  resources  are  the  financing  source  (Figure  2).  This  type  of  taxation 
depresses private consumption (by reducing disposable incomes) which hurts output and 
employment  growth  and  also  affects  private  provisioning  of  and  demand  for  social 
services. In our second policy scenario, therefore, the government needs to compensate 
for the loss of private spending on social services and further steps up efforts to keep 
MDG-related  public  spending  unchanged  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  after  2015.  Such 
macroeconomic trade-offs would need to be taken into consideration should governments 
pursue domestic resources mobilization to finance spending needs in pursuance of sound 
human development levels.   19 
Other aspects, like debt sustainability, support from foreign donors and the real 
feasibility of raising tax burdens need to be taken into consideration as well. It will be 
very  challenging  for  developing  countries  to  maintain  solid  human  development 
indicators considering that large amounts of foreign or domestic resources will need to be 
mobilized to finance the required public investments. Depending on the magnitude of 
these resource requirements, there could be undesirable macroeconomic implications and 
the interventions may confront political resistance. Tax revenues, in particular, can be 
raised depending on the initial levels of tax burden and, no less importantly, on political 
economy considerations. However, one should not be overly optimistic in regard to the 
speed at which developing countries would be able to effectively increase tax collection. 
 
Growth and productivity bonuses  
Governments of the four countries studied here will no doubt require stepping up upfront 
social spending and increasing effectiveness of this spending to aspire to sound human 
development standards. At the same time, they will need higher and sustained economic 
growth that creates private demand for education, health, and water and sanitation and 
allows  easing  fiscal  constraints  over  time.  Human  development  investments  can  also 
contribute to this process by spurring additional economic growth in the long run, which 
is corroborated by results presented in Table 4.  
In  the  four  policy  scenarios,  aggregate  demand  is  pushed  up  by  increased 
government spending to meet the MDG targets by 2015. This translates into higher GDP 
growth in all four scenarios (Sim1-Sim4)—compared with the baseline scenario—by an 
average  annual  range  of  0.6  to  1.8  percentage  points,  except  in  Bolivia.  Increased 
government spending is reflected in more hiring of teachers, doctors, and so on, and more 
demand  for  capital,  such  that  factor  accumulation  explains  most  GDP  growth  gains. 
However, the larger pool of employed skilled workers, mostly in MDG-related sectors, 
also contribute to an increase in TFP thus spurring GDP growth up to 2015. In the case of 
Bolivia, however, GDP growth is lower—than under the baseline scenario—because the 
mobilization of foreign resources mainly, but also new government investments in non-
tradable  sectors  such  as  education,  health,  and  so  on,  trigger  a  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation that penalizes exports and incentivises imports to an extent that cannot be   20 
fully offset by the push from government demand. The other three countries lose export 
competitiveness for the same reason, too, but the pace at which their government steps up 
interventions in the simulations more than offsets the deterioration of their trade balance. 
These  are  other  macroeconomic  trade-offs  that  countries  may  have  to  confront  when 
using foreign sources for financing human development. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Interestingly, according to the results of the first policy scenario (Sim1), GDP 
continues to grow more than in the baseline after 2015, now even in Bolivia, even though 
the government no longer deliberately steps up additional interventions to meet human 
development targets. GDP growth is about 1 percentage point or more higher than under 
the  baseline  in  Costa  Rica,  Uganda  and  Yemen,  and  0.2  percentage  point  above  the 
baseline growth rate in Bolivia (Table 4). This happens for two reasons. Firstly, factor 
accumulation carries on into post 2015, thus continuing to be, by and large, the most 
important  supply-side  driver  of  GDP  growth.  Domestic  demand  and  exports  adjust 
commensurately to match the supply-driven GDP growth. Exports, in particular, receive a 
strong push from real exchange rate depreciation as the need for foreign resources to 
finance MDG-spending is no longer as pressing as before 2015. Secondly, GDP growth 
also increases as a result of productivity gains. Enough time has elapsed in the post-2015 
period for children to go through one or more educational cycles and child and maternal 
health care to improve. The resulting increased stock of healthier and better-educated 
workers translates into more human capital, the employment of which produces higher 
labour productivity and economic growth. Over the long run, such productivity gains and 
economic growth would permit to reduce income poverty substantially and meet poverty 
reduction targets (MDG 1), provided the effect on per capita income is not offset by more 
income  inequality—the  analysis  of  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.
20 The 
question is whether developing countries’ economies can grow at such relatively high and 
stable rates, as assumed under the four simulated policy scenarios. As said, persistent 
                                                 
20 The effects on poverty, compared with what is seen under the baseline scenario, depend primarily on the 
final impact of both MDG spending and increased access to foreign resources or increased taxation on per 
capita income.   21 
international  financial  market  and  commodity  price  instability  tend  to  affect  these 
countries  to  varying  degrees,  and,  in  some  cases,  this  economic  uncertainty  may  be 
compounded by political conflict and instability. 
The financing needed to keep human development standards from deteriorating 
after  2015  would  also  continue  to  be  enormous  and  at  the  cost  of  potential 
macroeconomic trade-offs that may offset part of the economic growth gains. This would 
be  particularly  the  case  should  countries  need to  mobilize  domestic  resources  as  this 
financing option may affect private demand and, as a consequence, producers respond by 
demanding less factors of production. In fact, GDP growth and poverty reduction gains 
seen in the first scenario (Sim1) dissipate in the second (Sim2) whereby the government 
is assumed to use taxation to maintain human development levels without setbacks after 
2015 (Table 4). Therefore, the financing source of human development continues to pose 
macroeconomic challenges after 2015.  
 
Complementary investments to magnify economic gains  
In  view  of  fiscal  constraints  as  well  as  human  development  gaps  in  other  areas, 
governments may need to identify spending requirements that allow them to achieve, not 
necessarily  over-achieve,  development  goals  over  a  period  of  time.  In  this  way, 
governments may be able to redeploy some resources and spend them in other key social 
or economic sectors. Not only could these complementary interventions allow countries 
to  expand  the  scope  of  human  development  but  they  can  also  allow  for  additional 
productivity gains. The last two policy scenarios help illustrate that this may be the case. 
As indicated, in these scenarios the net (on time) primary completion rate is maintained 
just on target after 2015 (that is to say, without further improvements) and the resulting 
“public spending savings”—relative to the first two policy scenarios (Sim1-Sim2), where 
the  net  (on  time)  primary  completion  rate  improves  after  2015—are  allocated  to 
secondary and tertiary education (Sim3) or public infrastructure such as roads, bridges, 
and so on (Sim4). As shown in Table 4, additional productivity gains are seen in these 
last two policy scenarios. Compared with the first two policy scenarios, the alternative 
investments that are simulated in the last two scenarios contribute additional GDP growth   22 
between  0.1  and  0.5  percentage  points  per  year  after  2015.  Such  gains  may  not  be 
negligible for countries in desperate search of economic growth.  
 
Economic structure and labour market constraints 
Human development investments would not bear further productivity fruit should the 
economy’s structure not adjust commensurately to absorb the increased stock of better-
educated (and likely healthier) workers that forms as education targets are met and more 
students  are  likely  to  complete  higher  levels  of  education.  This  can  be  illustrated  by 
tracing  the  unemployment  rate  of  the  most  skilful  workers  in  any  of  the  four  policy 
scenarios. Let us use as an example the first policy scenario (Sim1) and the simulation 
results  for  Costa  Rica  and  Yemen,  the  two  countries  that,  by  and  large,  reap  most 
productivity gains from employing better-educated workers in all policy scenarios. The 
level of unemployment of these workers is much lower than that of other workers and 
declines substantially over the entire simulation period. It declines more rapidly as 2015 
approaches in the policy scenarios, though, as more doctors, teachers, and other highly 
qualified  workers  are  demanded  by  the  public  sector  (Figure  3).  The  educational 
composition  of  the  labour  force  shifts  in  favour  of  the  better-educated  workers. 
Interestingly, though, the supply of the most highly skilful workers increases to a point 
where the economy is no longer capable to absorb it to any further extent. By 2030, 
unemployment  of  these  highly  qualified  workers  is  higher  in  the  policy  scenarios 
compared with the baseline. 
  
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
A labour-market trend like this may have important implications for economic 
growth and development. If the economy’s structure does not adjust commensurately to 
absorb the increased supply of better-educated workers, the skill premium will likely fall, 
which may likely provide a disincentive to invest in education. Empirical studies of the 
determinants of access to education indicate that expected private returns to education are 
not the sole determinant by far, but an important one nonetheless (see, e.g., Glewwe, 
2002). Hence, insufficient creation of skilled jobs in the economy could jeopardize the   23 
achievement of education goals in the post-2015 era. It could also further result in high 
rates of (youth) unemployment and skill mismatches in the labour market that can be 
catalysts  of  underemployment,  resulting  in  negative  repercussions  in  terms  of  rising 
inequality of income and opportunities, more poverty (and lower achievement of MDG 1) 
and even conflict as it has been the case of some Arab countries. While these changes 
could  be  counteracted  by  additional  government  interventions  to  stimulate  school 
attendance and temporarily relieve the unemployed, the real problem would be how to 
improve the environment for stimulating a structural change in the economy towards 
technologies and activities that can absorb larger amounts of skilled labour. Part of the 
challenge for governments to address this potential mismatch between education and the 
labour market will be to make sure that the content of education and the skills that the 
education system creates are those that are on high demand by production sectors.  
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Developing countries have witnessed considerable strides towards meeting the MDGs, 
but important rewards associated with past human investments may still be to come. 
Investments  in  education  and  health  improve  social  outcomes  and  human  capital, 
enhancing labour productivity and economic growth. This process takes time, however, 
as children need to go through one or more educational cycles and improved child and 
maternal health care today will bring about rewards in terms of healthier students and 
workers several years from now. 
Social  and  economic  gains  after  2015  owing  to  previous  human  development 
investments have been quantified in the context of the MDGs using an economy-wide 
modelling scenario analysis applied to four countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Uganda and 
Yemen. Policy interventions that may contribute to ensure that such payoffs from human 
development investments materialize have also been recommended. The findings may 
become relevant at a time when the United Nations system is working ideas to define a 
broader post-2015 development agenda. 
  Under  a  baseline  scenario  that  delineates  a  continuation  of  currently  expected 
economic growth and current public spending interventions up to 2030, this paper shows 
that the four countries under study would make progress but eventually fail to meet, by   24 
2015, MDG targets for primary school completion, child and maternal mortality rates, 
and access to drinking water and basic sanitation. Under policy scenarios whereby public 
spending interventions are scaled up by enough to define a path towards fully meeting the 
targets by 2015, and GDP shares of MDG-related public spending remain unchanged in 
2016-2030, estimated fiscal costs are found to be considerable. Gains in economic growth 
owing to the additional MDG investments would, nonetheless, be expected to materialize 
owing  to  capital  accumulation  and  higher  labour  productivity.  Simulation  results  that 
most stand out are summarized as follows. 
  Additional public spending requirements to meet MDG targets would represent at 
least 4.0 to 8.5 per cent of GDP per year up to 2015 and would continue to be as costly 
(or even more so) after 2015 owing partly to decreasing marginal returns to additional 
public interventions. As a consequence, not only will countries confront the challenge of 
achieving human development goals by 2015 but also the other challenge of keeping 
them from deteriorating after 2015. Costs for public finances have been estimated to be 
slightly more if domestic resources rather than foreign sources are used to finance the 
required social expenditures.  
  The large amounts of domestic or foreign resources that will be needed could 
trigger undesirable macroeconomic trade-offs even after 2015, such as crowding out of 
private  spending,  loss  of  export  competitiveness  owing  to  appreciation  of  the  real 
exchange rate, unsustainable debt levels, and others, depending on the financing source. 
The  financing  strategy  will  also  matter  to  define  additional  spending  requirements. 
Increasing  direct-tax  revenues,  for  example,  may  depress  private  consumption  (by 
reducing disposable incomes) thus hurting output and employment growth, as well as 
private demand for and provisioning of social services. Under this scenario, a government 
would need to further step up efforts to avoid future setbacks in human development. 
This is a trade-off countries may necessarily need to endure considering that reliance on 
foreign  resources  may  not  be  sustainable  in  the  long  run  due  to  debt  sustainability 
considerations and the recent declining trend of foreign aid. 
  In view of the demanding spending requirements and the macro-economic trade-
offs,  developing  countries  such  as  those  studied  here  will  have  to  consider  a  mixed 
financing strategy for their development goals. In most cases, the balance in this mix   25 
should be tilted towards broadening the tax base, in particular given already high public 
debt  burdens  and  the  recent  declining  trend  shown  by  foreign  aid.  For  a  number  of 
countries (with less income), however, financing will unavoidably be needed because 
they  have  no  scope  for  further  raising  tax  revenues.  As  a  consequence,  adequate 
international financing will be required for these countries and, more importantly perhaps, 
the recent declining trend in foreign aid will have to be reversed. 
  Although the financing will be challenging, stepping up upfront public spending 
to meet MDG targets in the period to 2015 would boost aggregate demand and spur 
productivity growth as more teachers, doctors and other qualified workers are employed 
in MDG sectors. Through the scenario analysis it has been estimated that GDP growth 
would increase by 0.6 to 1.8 percentage points per year if the four countries’ governments 
pursue meeting the targets, provided the demand-driven push is not offset by sluggish 
export growth owing to real exchange rate appreciation. It has also been estimated that 
capital accumulation and productivity growth would carry on beyond 2015, generating 
additional GDP growth gains in a range of 0.2 to 1.0 percentage points per year. This is 
because enough time has elapsed for children to go through one or more educational 
cycles and child and maternal health care to have improved. The newly-added stock of 
better qualified workers is mirrored by more employment of these workers which, in turn, 
spurs labour productivity growth. Nonetheless, the scenario analysis further suggests that 
without complementary policy interventions that facilitate structural change there could 
be a point where the economy is no longer capable of absorbing newly-active skilful 
workers  to  a  further  extent.  The  effect  on  unemployment  may  have  undesirable 
consequences in the path towards development goals. Allowing this to occur would no 
doubt present a lost opportunity for countries.    
  Additional policy implications on the basis of the scenario analysis are threefold. 
Firstly,  developing  countries  may  need  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  service  delivery 
significantly  in  order  to  contain  costs  of  maintaining  human  development  goals  after 
2015. But high estimated costs are also associated with the fact that some of the MDG 
targets may be overly ambitious in the context of some developing countries when they 
are  applied  literally  as  defined  internationally.  Countries  may  need  to  reconsider 
redesigning the setting of their human development targets in terms of magnitude and the   26 
timing  at  which  they  can  be  realistically  met  by  and  after  2015.  Secondly,  countries 
should pursue additional policy interventions to spur stronger long-term economic gains 
from human development interventions. For example, based on the scenario analysis, 
more  allocation  of  public  spending  to  secondary  and  tertiary  education  or  public 
infrastructure  (roads,  bridges,  and  so  on)  underpins  stronger  economic  growth  and 
expands the scope of human development. Thirdly, insufficient creation of skilled jobs 
could result in high rates of (youth) unemployment and skill mismatches in the labour 
market that can be catalysts of underemployment, resulting in negative repercussions in 
terms of rising inequality of income and opportunities, and more poverty. To avoid such 
undesirable trade-offs and underpin long-term productivity and economic growth gains, 
policy  interventions  will  be  required  to  improve  the  environment  for  stimulating  a 
structural  change  in  the  economy  towards  technologies  and  activities  that  can  absorb 
larger amounts of skilled labour, improve the content of education, and ensure that the 
skills  that  the  education  system  creates  are  those  that  are  in  high  demand  by  the 
productive sector.   27 
Tables and figures to be inserted in text 
 
Table 1  Macroeconomic indicators in the baseline scenario (period annual averages, per cent) 
  Bolivia    Costa Rica    Uganda    Yemen 
  Pre-2015
a  Post-2015
a    Pre-2015
a  Post-2015
a    Pre-2015
a  Post-2015
a    Pre-2015
a  Post-2015
a 
Real growth rate                       
Consumption - private  7.2  4.8    5.2  4.2    6.1  7.5    5.4  4.8 
Consumption - government  4.8  4.8    7.2  5.0    7.2  8.3    5.8  5.2 
Fixed investment - private  7.1  5.2    5.1  3.7    6.5  8.2    5.3  4.9 
Fixed investment - government  4.8  5.1    13.6  3.8    8.7  8.4    5.6  5.1 
Exports  2.9  5.8    3.2  3.8    7.1  4.4    2.3  4.3 
Imports  7.2  5.2    4.4  4.0    6.3  8.1    4.3  4.6 
GDP  4.7  5.0    4.5  4.2    6.5  7.0    5.1  5.2 
                       
Share of nominal GDP                       
Consumption - private  75.6  73.4    72.3  70.7    78.9  81.6    68.9  73.4 
Consumption - government  14.4  14.5    16.6  17.9    9.7  9.7    12.7  12.4 
Investment - private  8.6  8.5    16.4  16.3    17.8  17.8    11.1  11.6 
Investment - government  6.3  6.0    4.6  5.1    5.8  6.4    10.5  11.0 
Exports  28.4  29.7    41.9  41.4    21.4  17.9    35.8  36.1 
Imports  -33.2  -32.2    -52.4  -51.4    -33.6  -33.4    -39.0  -44.6 
Foreign savings  3.2  5.7    9.7  10.7    9.0  9.6    1.0  5.1 
a Pre-2015 and post-2015 periods used in this and subsequent tables and figures are defined in the text. 
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
   28 
Table 2  Key determinants of MDG indicators in the baseline scenario (period annual average growth, per cent) 
  Bolivia    Costa Rica    Uganda    Yemen 
  Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015 
                       
Real per-capita government consumption 
by MDG-related service                       
Primary education   2.7  3.4    6.1  4.4    4.2  4.5    2.9  1.5 
Health  2.9  3.5    6.0  3.8    3.9  4.3    2.2  2.5 
Water and sanitation  3.0  3.6    4.7  2.7    4.4  4.8    2.0  2.5 
                       
Real per-capita private consumption by 
MDG-related service and total                        
Primary education   6.2  4.2    2.4  2.8    2.3  5.1    2.9  2.6 
Health  5.0  3.8    2.4  2.7    4.3  4.3    4.3  4.0 
Water and sanitation 
a  --  --    2.3  2.0    2.7  4.8    2.2  2.1 
                       
Total real per-capita private consumption 
of the economy  5.2  3.3    3.8  3.2    2.7  4.5    2.3  2.1 
                       
Public infrastructure capital stock  5.3  5.3    13.0  6.0    5.6  6.8    5.2  5.2 
a National accounts used to construct Bolivia's SAM—with which MAMS is calibrated—do not report private spending in water and sanitation separately.   
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study.  29 
Table 3  Main characteristics of MDG-achieving scenarios  
  Sim1  Sim2  Sim3  Sim4 
MDG-related 
public spending 
a 
Increases until 
targets are met in 
2015 
GDP share of 
2015 fixed in 
2016-30 
Increases until 
targets are met in 
2015 
GDP share of 
2015 fixed in 
2016-30 
Increases until 
targets are met in 
2015 
GDP share of 
2015 fixed in 
2016-30, except 
for primary 
education 
Increases until 
targets are met in 
2015 
GDP share of 
2015 fixed in 
2016-30, except 
for primary 
education 
Financing of 
MDG-related 
public spending 
Foreign 
financing 
through 2030 
Foreign 
financing 
through 2015 
Direct-tax 
financing during 
2016-30 
Foreign 
financing 
through 2030 
Foreign 
financing 
through 2030 
MDG indicators  Improve through 
2030 
Improve through 
2030 
Improve through 
2030, primary 
completion rate 
of 2015 fixed in 
2016-30 
Improve through 
2030, primary 
completion rate 
of 2015 fixed in 
2016-30 
Complementary 
public 
investments 
    Secondary and 
tertiary education 
Public 
infrastructure  
a Includes all investment and current expenditures in primary education, health and water and sanitation. 
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study.   30 
Table 4  Real macroeconomic indicators and headcount poverty rate in the MDG-achieving scenarios (period annual averages, 
deviation from the baseline) 
    Bolivia    Costa Rica    Uganda    Yemen 
    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015 
Sim1 
GDP growth (per cent)  -0.6  0.2    0.9  0.9    1.8  0.7    0.6  1.6 
Total factor employment (index)  -0.6  0.2    0.8  0.4    1.1  0.5    0.4  1.2 
Total factor productivity (index) 
a  0.0  0.1    0.1  0.5    0.6  0.2    0.1  0.5 
 - most skilful labour employment
   -0.0502  0.0516    0.1486  0.4432    0.6279  0.2396    0.1466  0.4432 
 - public infrastructure  0.0000  -0.0014    0.0000  0.0118    0.0000  0.0056    0.0000  0.0118 
 - trade openness  0.0017  0.0029    0.0000  0.0000    -0.0047  0.0004    0.0000  0.0000 
Real exchange rate (index)  -4.9  0.2    -3.6  0.1    -6.2  1.0    -4.4  1.3 
Headcount poverty rate (per cent)  -1.4  -1.7    -1.0  -0.9    -4.8  -1.7    -6.0  -12.1 
Sim2 
GDP growth (per cent)  -0.6  0.0    0.9  0.0    1.8  -0.4    0.6  0.0 
Total factor employment (index)  -0.6  0.0    0.8  -0.3    1.1  -0.3    0.4  -0.3 
Total factor productivity (index)
 a  0.0  0.0     0.1  0.3    0.6  0.0    0.1  0.3 
 - most skilful labour employment
   -0.0502  0.0285    0.1486  0.3637    0.6279  -0.0142    0.1466  0.3637 
 - public infrastructure  0.0000  -0.0197    0.0000  -0.0441    0.0000  -0.0333    0.0000  -0.0441 
 - trade openness  0.0017  -0.0035    0.0000  0.0000    -0.0047  -0.0004    0.0000  0.0000 
Real exchange rate (index)  -4.9  3.1    -3.6  2.2    -6.2  3.5    -4.4  4.0 
Headcount poverty rate (per cent)  -1.4  4.2    -1.0  0.4    -4.8  0.9    -6.0  8.1 
Sim3 
GDP growth (per cent)  -0.6  0.5    0.9  1.0    1.8  0.9    0.6  1.9 
Total factor employment (index)  -0.6  0.4    0.8  0.3    1.1  0.5    0.4  1.3 
Total factor productivity (index)
 a  0.0  0.0    0.1  0.6    0.6  0.4    0.1  0.6 
 - most skilful labour employment
   -0.0502  0.0222    0.1486  0.6067    0.6279  0.3586    0.1466  0.6067 
 - public infrastructure  0.0000  -0.0002    0.0000  0.0125    0.0000  0.0061    0.0000  0.0125 
 - trade openness  0.0017  0.0027    0.0000  0.0000    -0.0047  0.0004    0.0000  0.0000 
Real exchange rate (index)  -4.9  0.3    -3.6  0.0    -6.2  1.2    -4.4  1.4 
Headcount poverty rate (per cent)  -1.4  -1.9    -1.0  -0.9    -4.8  -1.8    -6.0  -12.3 
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Table 4  continued 
    Bolivia    Costa Rica    Uganda    Yemen 
    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015    Pre-2015  Post-2015 
Sim4 
GDP growth (per cent)  -0.6  0.7    0.9  0.9    1.8  0.7    0.6  2.0 
Total factor employment (index)  -0.6  0.3    0.8  0.2    1.1  0.3    0.4  1.2 
Total factor productivity (index)
 a  0.0  0.3    0.1  0.8    0.6  0.4    0.1  0.8 
 - most skilful labour employment
   -0.0502  0.0578    0.1486  0.4677    0.6279  0.2096    0.1466  0.4677 
 - public infrastructure  0.0000  0.2739    0.0000  0.3006    0.0000  0.1781    0.0000  0.3006 
 - trade openness  0.0017  0.0023    0.0000  0.0000    -0.0047  0.0008    0.0000  0.0000 
Real exchange rate (index)  -4.9  0.5    -3.6  0.2    -6.2  1.3    -4.4  1.7 
Headcount poverty rate (per cent)  -1.4  -2.3    -1.0  -0.9    -4.8  -1.8    -6.0  -11.4 
a Changes in the total factor productivity index are decomposed into three effects. Most skilful labour refers to workers who have completed at least secondary 
education. In the case of Costa Rica, most skilful labour only refers to workers who have obtained a diploma or degree in tertiary education, an alternative 
definition that allows us to better adapt the modelling analysis to the country’s context. 
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
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Figure 1  MDG indicators in the baseline scenario and targets
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a Indicators presented are the following: mdg1, percentage of the population living on less than an 
income per capita level below a national poverty line: mdg2, net (on-time) primary school completion 
rate: mdg4, under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births; mdg5, maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 
live births; and mdg7w and mdg7s, proportion of people with sustainable access to, respectively, safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation. Targets are for 2015 and in most cases refer to internationally-
agreed goals. The target for mdg2 relates to completion for the first four grades of primary education in 
Yemen and for the full primary cycle in the other countries. Base year (byr) is: 2006 for Bolivia, 2005 
for Costa Rica, 2009/2010 for Uganda and 2004 for Yemen.  
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
  
33 
Figure 2  MDG-related  public  spending  in  the  baseline  and  the  first  two  MDG-
achieving scenarios before and after 2015
a (per cent of GDP, period annual 
averages) 
 
a MDG-related public spending and MDG-achieving scenarios are defined in the text.  
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
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Figure 3  Unemployment rate of the most highly skilful workers under the baseline 
and the first MDG-achieving scenario, 2005, 2015 and 2030 (per cent) 
   
Note: Most highly skilful workers are those who possess a diploma or degree in tertiary education.  
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
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Appendix of tables and figures 
 
Figure A1  MDG indicators in first MDG-achieving scenario and targets
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a Indicators, targets and base year (byr) are defined in the note to Figure 1.  
Source: Authors, based on application of MAMS with data for the countries under study. 
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